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joining the faculty at Georgetown, she served as Special Litigation Counsel to the Civil Rights
Division of the U.S. Justice Department and an attorney with the U.S. Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission. She is also well-known for her academic work in sex discrimination
law in the United States. Professor Ross will share with us insights from the clinical work
she directs in Africa, in which treaty compliance has formed the basis for both legislative
reform and test-case litigation in women’s human rights.
Third, Navraj Singh Ghaleigh is Lecturer in Public Law at the University of Edinburgh.
Formerly, Mr. Ghaleigh was a barrister in London and Lecturer at King’s College London.
He undertook his graduate work at the University of Cambridge, the European University
Institute (Florence), and the University of California at Berkeley as a Fulbright scholar. He
will speak about his work in the European Union on legal responses to climate change
involving international, regional, and national bodies.
Fourth, Arnold Zack, currently serves as President of the Asian Development Bank Admin-
istrative Tribunal. Judge Zack is a well-known labor arbitrator and mediator. He is affiliated
with Harvard Law School’s Labor and Worklife Program, where he is a Lecturer on Designing
and Managing Dispute Resolution Systems. He is the author of 12 books on union management
issues, internationally and in the United States. Judge Zack will speak to us this morning
about the International Labor Organization’s role in labor standards compliance and dispute
resolution through arbitration.
Iterative Engagements: The European Union
and International Normativity
By Navraj Singh Ghaleigh*
The process of internalizing international norms into domestic law is a matter of contention
in all polities, to varying degrees of intensity. Harold Koh’s provocative thesis of transnational
norm generation—of nation-state and transnational private actors blending national and
international legal processes such that international norms are internalized into domestic
law—is considerably less provocative in the European Union than in its country of origin.
Whereas public international law can elsewhere be seen principally as a constraint on indepen-
dent action, the European Union has frequently deployed it as an instrument for the advance-
ment of European integration. As such, the process of ‘‘translation’’ is less a matter of
hypothetical speculation in the European Union than a known mode of legal and political
activity. Commencing with some brief stage-setting, this short paper will analyze two separate
bodies of international legal norms—those pertaining to anthropogenic climate change, and
business and human rights—and argues that in the EU context at least, ‘‘translation’’ is best
seen as one part of a highly iterative process of dynamic relations between levels.
The broad receptiveness1 of the European Union to translating international legal norms
into domestic ones derives in part from the fact that the European Union is itself a creation
of public international law. Its foundational milestones are marked by international treaties
which ‘‘member states have drawn up in order to create and define the tools of their European
co-operation . . . international law has provided, from the start and until now, the legal
* Lecturer in Public Law, Edinburgh Law School, University of Edinburgh.
1 The qualification highlights the sometime problematic relationship between international and European law—
see Kadi & Al Barakaat Int’l Found. v. Council & Comm’n, E.C.R I-6351 (2008), and its voluminous attendant
literature.
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instruments needed for the overall organisation of European integration.’’2 These treaties
(of Rome, Maastricht, Lisbon, and so on) serve to advance a variety of internal development
needs of the European Union, but they also drive its external influence—‘‘[the] EU actively
seeks to export a particular set of internal legal rules to third countries by means of a bilateral
or multilateral agreement, thereby ‘projecting the acquis.’’’3 In this respect, the European
Union adopts the role of what Koh would recognize as a ‘‘governmental norm sponsor,’’
commonly in concert with civil society ‘‘norm entrepreneurs.’’ Indeed, the European Union
describes itself as an ‘‘emerging . . . global rule maker.’’4
Global climate change regulation is a policy area in which the European Union regards
itself as a successful norm sponsor, with its greenhouse gas emissions trading scheme (‘‘EU
ETS’’) as a flagship legal instrument.5 However, this policy area has been characterized
equally by the European Union’s successes and failures regarding norm entrepreneurship. It
is worth recalling that the deployment of market mechanisms to redress the externality of
greenhouse gas emissions issued from U.S. proposals at the third Conference of the Parties
of the UNFCCC in 1997, in the face of strong opposition from the European Union.6 The
European Union had traditionally harbored suspicions toward market-based approaches to
environmental regulations, preferring so-called ‘‘command and control’’ mechanisms such
as ‘‘best available technology’’ or ambient standards. However, that debate was lost by the
European Union at the Conference of the Parties with the result that the agreement struck,
the Kyoto Protocol, has become a byword for market-based approaches to environmental
regulation. In these terms, therefore, the United States proved itself to be the telling ‘‘rule
generator,’’ not the European Union, with its ability to demonstrate the success of its own
SOx/NOx markets as the decisive factor.7 Lest this be considered an instance overtaken by
events, it should be recalled that at the 2009 Copenhagen Conference of the Parties, the
United States again proved to be the decisive Annex I actor.8
In these terms, the European Union might be better described as a climate change ‘‘loser’’
rather than a ‘‘reference point in third countries as well as in global and regional fora.’’9
However, such a judgment would fail to account for the European Union’s post-1997 Dama-
scene conversion to the gospel of the markets, which in turn helped establish itself as the
dominant player in the global carbon market. The EU ETS’s share of the global carbon
market in 2008 was approximately $92 billion, ‘‘accounted for by transactions of allowances
and derivatives under the [EU ETS] for compliance, risk management, arbitrage, raising cash
and profit-taking purposes,’’ from a total transacted value of $126 billion.10 The second
largest element of the market is the secondary market for CERs (the units of the Kyoto
Protocol’s CDM), whose transactions for 2008 amounted to a mere $26 billion. Even in this
global market, firms subject to the acquis communautaire dominate. Of the 2,517 CDM
2 Bruno de Witte, International Law as a Tool for the European Union, 5 Eur. Const. L. Rev. 265–83, 266 (2009).
3 Id. at 278. The term ‘‘acquis communautaire’’ refers to the accumulated body of EU law.
4 Id. at 278, n.42.
5 Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, Emissions Trading Before the European Court of Justice: Market Making in Luxembourg,
in Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto, Copenhagen and Beyond (David Freestone & Charlotte Streck
eds., 2009).
6 Navraj Singh Ghaleigh, Anti-Americanism and the Environment, in 1 Anti-Americanism: History, Causes,
Themes 139 (Brendan O’Connor ed., 2007).
7 Id.
8 Mark Landler & Helene Cooper, After a Bitter Campaign, Forging an Alliance, N.Y. Times, Mar. 18, 2010.
9 De Witte, supra note 2, at 278.
10 World Bank, State and Trends of the Carbon Market 2009, at 1 (2009).
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projects recognized by the CDM Executive Board, in 2,284 (91%) instances the Designated
Operational Entity is a European enterprise, as are 87% of investor parties (figures arrived
at by searching the CDM site).
As noted elsewhere, ‘‘[t]he EU ETS’s trading volumes dwarf those of its rivals none of
which has a volume equal to even 1% of the EU ETS. The Scheme’s position of primacy
will remain unchallenged unless and until a federal US scheme is established.’’11 At the
time of this writing, a U.S. federal scheme12 again seems a dim prospect and even the most
ambitious version of the current legislative proposals (3% emission reduction by 2020 against
a 1990 baseline) fails to generate emission reductions even close to the levels achieved by
the EU ETS (20% emission reductions by 2020 against a 1990 baseline, possibly rising to
30%), limiting their potential share of the global carbon market.
The importance of the European Union’s dominance of carbon markets may appear from
the foregoing to be substantially a matter of market power, but this fact, of course, has
normative implications. To take but one, as emissions trading schemes proliferate (and they
do), policymakers desire that they ‘‘link’’ to one another to generate liquidity and other
market goods. Such linking ‘‘depends on the respective compatibility of the underlying
emissions trading scheme [in terms of] the equivalence of requirements for participating
sectors . . . and procedural aspects such as monitoring, reporting, verification, and enforce-
ment.’’13 Reconciling the inevitable differences between schemes ‘‘is not primarily a task
for lawyers, but an inherently political assignment,’’14 and insofar as that is the case, the
overwhelming market power of the EU ETS would allow the European Union substantially
to dictate terms to those wishing to link to it. In this way, the European Union would not
be compelling other nations to translate international (UNFCCC) norms into their domestic
law, so much as deploying market dominance to persuade them to internalize particular (EU)
interpretations of them into their domestic law. Such normative influence as the European
Union may wield in this realm stems not from its ability to determine treaty negotiations,
but from its successful response to the conditions created thereby—a case of losing the war
but winning the peace.
The second policy area for consideration is the nascent international legal regime pertaining
to transnational corporations and human rights. As is well known, the gap between the
operational capacities of transnational corporations (TNCs) and the regulatory reach of states
has grown steadily. This in turn has generated a plethora of regulatory responses of which
the United Nations’ draft Norms on the Responsibility of Transnational Corporations and
Other Business Enterprises with Regard to Human Rights (‘‘Draft Norms’’) are the best
known.15 Grounded in ambitious and contentious principles of the direct application of human
rights norms to TNCs, the Draft Norms project was abandoned amid claims of subversion
of accepted notions of sovereignty and state responsibility, although the baton was carried
forward by the appointment in 2005 of Professor John Ruggie as the Secretary General’s
11 Ghaleigh, supra note 5, at 367.
12 David Freestone & David Frenkil, Emissions Trading in the US: A New Regime Approaching?, VII Eur.
Energy L. Rep. 75–94 (2010).
13 Michael Mehling, Linking of Emissions Trading Schemes, in Legal Aspects of Carbon Trading: Kyoto,
Copenhagen and Beyond, supra note 5, at 110–11.
14 Id. at 133.
15 UN Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/2003/L.8 (Aug. 7, 2003).
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Special Representative for Human Rights and Business (‘‘SGSR’’).16 The approach of the
SGSR, which has focused not on the notion of direct obligation of TNCs but, rather, on the
legal obligations issuing from states and those obligations that directly affect corporations
under traditional conceptions of law, was first articulated comprehensively in ‘‘Protect,
Respect and Remedy: A Framework for Business and Human Rights.’’17 This ‘‘synthesis’’
report identified three overlapping principles: the state duty to protect, the corporate responsi-
bility to respect, and access to remedies—the details and implications of which are too
numerous and complex for treatment here. Rather, the response of the EU will be briefly
outlined.
In 2009 the European Commission (Directorate-General for Enterprise and Industry) com-
missioned a study to analyze the existing legal framework for human rights and the environ-
ment applicable to European enterprises operating outside the European Union, with a view
to contributing to the further operationalization of the UN Framework (undertaken by this
author and colleagues at Edinburgh Law School). The study complements the UN Framework
in focusing on European law and member state law applicable to European enterprises
operating outside the European Union and reaches beyond it by considering environmental
law in addition to human rights law.18 In so doing, the study inter alia identifies opportunities
for the European Union and its member states to contribute to the operationalization of the
UN Framework from a European perspective. The study team is assisted by regular meetings
with a Commission-selected ‘‘stakeholder committee’’ (composed of representatives from
the major EU trade associations, industry groups, trade unions, and environmental and human
rights pressure groups—Koh’s ‘‘transnational norm entrepreneurs’’) and discussions with
the office of the SGSR itself.
In evidence is something beyond a predilection of the European Union to receive interna-
tional norms with open arms. What is noteworthy is the early engagement of the ‘‘UN
Framework’’ by the European Union—the attempt not merely to understand its own relation-
ship to it and compliance ability, but also the determination to promote its own substantive
regime as the Framework evolves towards its final form, due in April 2011. This is not
construing national law to comply with international legal standards, or an example of
international law which is ‘‘downloaded’’ (to use Koh’s term) into national law but, rather,
an attempt to ‘‘upload’’ EU law and legal policy preferences into the international legal
development process.
Whereas the climate law example is one of the European Union adapting to an international
regime (the architecture of which was avowedly not of its choosing), the response to the
‘‘UN Framework’’ is an attempt to shape the regime at its earliest stages of development.
In both cases though, and as in other policy areas,19 EU engagement in international lawmaking
is structured to export the European Union’s own models of law where possible (because
they are believed to be best, to avoid the need for internal adaptation, to promote the
international identity of the European Union, etc.) and where not, to adapt to international
norms so as to be able to shape the future regime iteratively. As Koh argues, ‘‘through
16 The abandonment of the Draft Norms project and subsequent work of Ruggie has been criticized in this
publication. David Weissbrodt, UN Perspectives on Business and Humanitarian and Human Rights Obligations,
100 ASIL Proc. 135 (2006).
17 UN Doc. A/HRC/8/5 (Apr. 7, 2008) (‘‘UN Framework’’).
18 Study of the Legal Framework on Human Rights and the Environment Applicable to European Enterprises
Operating Outside the EU, available at http://tinyurl.com/6hx4pm2.
19 Gra´inne de Bu´rca, The EU In The Negotiations of the Disability Convention, Eur. L. Rev. (forthcoming 2010).
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repeated cycles of ‘interaction-interpretation-internalization,’ interpretations of applicable
global norms are eventually internalized into states’ domestic legal systems.’’20
The International Labor Organization and the Translation of
International Norms into Domestic Law
By Arnold M. Zack*
Inherent in the title of this panel is the recognition that what we tend to embrace as
substantive international law is, in reality, a set of international norms or standards adopted
by public international organizations empowered by treaty agreements among member states.
Those public international institutions possess organs and structures distinct from those of
their member states and transform those norms into the law of those under its international
jurisdiction. The question before us is the extent to which those norms or organizational
laws come to be accepted as standards to be followed by national governments and other
players. Some players are global in reach, such as the FAO or UN or ILO, while others are
regional in impact such as EBRD or the OAS.
In addition to the substantive international norms, of course, there are also procedural
norms and standards adopted by these organizations, which likewise may have their impact
on domestic law and on the standards followed by players in the global arena. These
procedural norms evolve from diverse national concepts of justice and fairness, as well as
our subconscious perceptions of fairness; are embraced and molded by the international
organizations as they develop substantive norms; and become an essential ingredient in
developing domestic law and the law of international organizations. Both common-law and
code societies share many of the elements which evolve into what we have come to accept
as the rule of law to guide those who follow international substantive norms.
In my particular area of interest—workplace fairness—the International Labor Organization
is the international entity which, since 1919, has been the architect and initiator of international
norms for the world’s workplaces. Its tripartite structure composed of worker, government,
and employer representatives from each member nation has been the vehicle that has enabled
it to establish consensus for workplace norms within its member delegations. Through their
adoption by its 183 member countries, this has resulted in the promulgation of 180 ILO
Conventions.
When ratified by a member state, an ILO Convention gains the status of national law.
Unfortunately, not all nations that have ratified ILO conventions live up to their commitments.
Governments that have blithely ratified all ILO conventions may still be guilty of gross
violations of a wide range of workplace protections. Others, including the United States,
have tended to conform to the ideals of the Conventions, even though lagging in having
ratified them. The United States has ratified only two of the eight Core or Fundamental
Human Rights Conventions. We have not ratified one of two prohibiting forced labor and
one of two prohibiting child labor, or the conventions guaranteeing freedom of association
and the right to collective bargaining. However, despite this sorry record, even when not
fully adopted into national law by member states, the ILO conventions have come to be
recognized as the universal goal for providing a decent work environment.
20 Harold H. Koh, Why Transnational Law Matters, 24 Penn St. Int’l Rev. 745 (2006).
* President, Administrative Tribunal of the Asian Development Bank.
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